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A Critical Look at the Use of Group Projects as a Pedagogical Tool 
 
An Abstract 
In business schools across the U.S. one of the most common pedagogical tools is 
the use of groups and group projects. “Passive” instruction, i.e., lecture only, is 
considered to be an inferior mode of teaching. It is suggested in this paper that the use of 
group-based projects as pedagogical tools should be reconsidered. Because of the 
difference in the “number” of games played in a real work environment versus in the 
classroom setting, and the knowledge thereof, the problem of free riding in a classroom 
setting intensifies. Relatively less motivated students end up getting higher grades at the 
cost of lower grades for industrious students.  
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In business schools across the U.S., the use of groups and group projects is very 
common. “Passive” instruction, i.e., lecture only, is considered to be an inferior mode of 
teaching (Bartlett 1995a, 1995b; Batra, Walvoord, & Krishnan, 1997; Bowen, Kent, 
Clark, Holloway, & Wheelwright, 1994; Comer, 1995;  Goodsell, Maher, & Tinto, 1992; 
Johnson, Johnson, & Smith, 1991; Kerr, 1983; McCorkle, Diriker, & Alexander, 1992; 
McKinney & Graham-Buxton, 1993; Moore, 1998; Rau & Heyl, 1990; Strong & 
Anderson, 1990; William, Beard, & Rymer, 1991). Economics courses, however, seem to 
be the exception where professors prefer lecture and chalk board techniques (Benzing & 
Christ, 1997; Becker & Watts, 2001).  
As the substantial benefits of teamwork to the firm became known, employers 
expected and received an increased emphasis on group-based class projects by the 
schools. In a recent study, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) found that on average, 
with the introduction of teams, productivity at a garment plant increased by 14 percent. 
Educators try to instill the value of teamwork in students by using group-based class 
projects. The question addressed here is whether a classroom setting is conducive to 
learning how to be a team player. A game theoretic approach is utilized to support the 
argument that a classroom setting is different from the real world.  
A major difference between classroom and workplace is that in a classroom, 
students play a finite number of games with the number of games known. In a work 
environment, however, workers play a finite number of games with the number of games 
unknown. As such, a classroom setting is not necessarily conducive to learning how to be 
a team player.  
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There are six different group situations presented in this paper. These scenarios 
demonstrate that “Less Motivated” students get better grades at the cost of lower grades 
for “Industrious” students.  
 Various teaching and learning benefits of group projects have been discussed in 
the business pedagogical literature. Some of the benefits that supposedly accrue to 
students listed in literature include cooperative and peer learning, peer modeling, 
teamwork, and efficiency. The benefits that presumably accrue to professors, mentioned 
in literature, include fewer papers to grade and the freedom to assign more 
comprehensive projects. 
The literature on the topic also criticizes the practice of assigning group projects 
in a classroom setting because of the possibility of free riding; high transaction costs, 
especially if students are commuting from different places or have inflexible schedules 
due to other obligations (e.g. family, work); poor product quality; stifled individual 
creativity because of within group dynamics; and poorly structured job, which may result 
in delays.  
It is also argued that group projects serve as latent barriers to learning new skills. 
Students tend to divide the workload of a large project, and a given student will pick the 
task that he/she has done in some other project. This means that the student will not learn 
any new skills. This will also lead to the absence of broader knowledge. 
From this brief review of the existing literature on the topic, there is not enough 
evidence for or against the use of groups and group projects as pedagogical tools. 
Furthermore, the existing literature is primarily anecdotal. It is based on personal opinion. 
Studies rely on survey data, and lack rigor in collection and the analyses of data. These 
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concerns warrant interrogation of the use of groups and group projects as pedagogical 
tools from a theoretical point of view.  
The debate is not over the importance of teamwork. It is an established fact that 
employers seek a team player when making hiring decisions. The question is whether a 
classroom setting is appropriate for acquiring such skills. Does the use of groups and 
group projects as pedagogical tools pay off or does it train “Less Motivated” students to 
become proficient free riders at the cost of lower grades for “Industrious” students?   
 
Theoretical Models 
This section presents six models. The basic assumptions of these models are: 
i. There are two major types of students: “Industrious” and “Less Motivated.” The titles 
of “Industrious” and “Less Motivated” are purely based on the GPA of the students and 
their aptitude toward work. That is, a student is considered “Industrious” if he/she has a 
high GPA and wants to work. On the other hand a student is considered “Less 
Motivated” if he/she does not want to work or has a low GPA, or both. The choice 
between working and not working depends upon the stakes. The higher the stakes a 
student has, the harder the student will work. An underlying assumption is that 
Industrious student always has higher stake compared with Less Motivated student. As 
such, Industrious student always works at least as hard as Less Motivated student.  
ii. The models assume that there are benefits and costs associated with getting good 
grades. The benefits of good grades are obvious (e.g. better job opportunities, happier 
parents, self satisfaction, etc). However costs can be divided into two categories: One, 
costs associated purely with work required for the projects, w. These costs include the 
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time spent on doing the research for the project, learning new techniques for analysis 
and putting the project together. Two, costs associated with pulling the weight of other 
student(s), c. These costs include trying to arrange meetings with the rest of the group 
members, time spent persuading other group members to move in a certain direction 
and explaining concepts to the rest of the group members. Formally speaking, let Pi be 
the net payoff to student i, bi be the benefit from a good grade to student i, wi is the 
amount of work put in by student i, and ci is the cost associated with pulling the weight 
of the other student (for i = Industrious, Less Motivated). The net payoff to student i 
may be written as Pi = bi - wi - ci. Since wIndustrious ≥ wLess Motivated, cIndustrious > 0, and cLess 
Motivated = 0, this implies that PLess Motivated > PIndustrious. That is, Less Motivated student’s 
net payoffs are always greater than Industrious student’s net payoffs and Industrious 
student bears the cost. 
iii. Grades are awarded at the end of the project, and are based on the finished project and 
not on effort. The grading scale is: A, B, C and F (except in the cases of Models 5 and 
6, where the choices are A and F). Where A is the highest and F is the lowest. 
Furthermore, A  B  C  F for both Industrious and Less Motivated student. 
iv. Groups may be formed in three ways: (a) Industrious student with Industrious student, 
(b) Less Motivated student with Less Motivated student, and (c) Industrious student 
with Less Motivated student. Furthermore, partners may be assigned by the professors. 
The assignment may be random or deliberate. Alternatively, students may pick their 
own partners. 
These four assumptions are true for all models presented in this paper. However, 
each model has its own set of additional assumptions. 
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Instructional Model 1 presented here assumes: (a) only one project; (b) two 
players, Industrious student and Less Motivated student; (c) perfect and complete 
information; and (d) no monitoring. That is, the professor does not know which student 
did how much work. As a result there are no penalties for shirking and both students get 
the same grade. 
 The payoffs matrix for Model 1 is presented in Table 1. In the payoffs matrix, the 
first letter is the payoff of the row player and the second letter is the payoff of the column 
player, i.e., Less Motivated student and Industrious student, respectively. The matrix 
presents four possible situations: (a) neither Industrious student nor Less Motivated 
student work (grades are F, F); (b) Less Motivated student works but Industrious student 
doesn’t work (grades are B, B); (c) Industrious student works but Less Motivated student 
doesn’t work, (grades are B, B); and (d) both students work (grades are A, A). 
Since by assumption Industrious student always works and Less Motivated 
student does not, this rules out situations (a), (b) and (d). The only possible outcome is 
presented by situation (c), where Industrious student works and Less Motivated student 
does not. Both students get B’s. Note that situation (d) carries a payoff of grade A for 
both the students. This is because if both students work and neither has to carry the 
other’s weight, the quality of work increases. However since Less Motivated student is a 
free rider and Industrious student has to carry the weight of the former, the overall grade 
suffers. That is, both students get B’s. 
Note also that the grade of Industrious student may decrease from A to B for two 
reasons: One, Industrious student has to carry the weight of Less Motivated student. This 
demands extra effort on the part of Industrious student. The effort expended on pulling 
 7 
Less Motivated student along could be directed towards the project, leading to a higher 
grade. Two, the grade is assigned to the finished project, and since the professor has no 
way of monitoring, there are no rewards for extra effort or penalties for shirking. 
Instructional Model 2 carries the first three assumptions of Model 1. The fourth 
assumption of no monitoring is replaced with monitoring and it is assumed that shirking 
is penalized by lowering the grade of the shirker.  
  The payoffs matrix is presented in Table 2. Again, the only feasible outcome is 
presented in the upper-right corner. However, notice that Industrious student still suffers 
in terms of grade. He/she could have earned an A instead of a B if he/she did not have to 
pull Less Motivated student along. In other words, just penalizing Less Motivated student 
is not enough. Unless there is some reward for Industrious student in carrying Less 
Motivated student along, Industrious student will be short-changed in terms of grades. 
Instructional Model 3 (payoffs matrix not presented) permits the students to pick 
their own partners. Along with the assumptions of one project and two students, 
Industrious student and Less Motivated, it also assumes perfect but (two-sided) 
incomplete information. That is, each player knows other player’s actions before he/she 
makes his/her own move. However, each player is not aware of the other player’s 
payoffs. 
 However notice that under the assumption that the amount of effort put in the 
project is a function of the level of stake (Assumption i), and each student knows what 
he/she has at stake for him/herself, the knowledge about the payoffs of other student 
becomes irrelevant. Industrious student always works and Less Motivated student always 
does not work. The presence of incomplete information and the ability to pick one’s own 
 8 
partner do not change the results and Less Motivated student gets higher grades at the 
expense of lower grades for Industrious student. 
Instructional Model 4 (payoffs matrix not presented) relaxes the assumption of 
having only one project but maintains the assumption of two students in a group, 
Industrious and Less Motivated. Players are expected to play finite repeated games with 
number of games known. It also assumes that each student has the chance to have the 
same partner in other class projects (or classes). 
Would the knowledge that one could partner with the same student in later class 
projects change the way one student behaves in an earlier class projects? “Backward 
Induction” dictates that as long as the number of games is known, each player behaves as 
if it were a one-shot game. In our case the implication is that as long as the number of 
projects is known, the multiplicity of projects does not affect our outcome: Industrious 
student always works and Less Motivated student does not. 
Instructional Model 5 (payoffs matrix presented in Table 3) relaxes the 
assumption of only two students in a group. It is assumed that there are three students in a 
group and at least two students are required to work to get a good grade. For the ease of 
exposition we maintain the assumptions of one project and no monitoring and further 
assume that: (a) grades are A and F, and (b) complete and imperfect information. That is, 
each student knows other students’ payoffs. However, each student does not know other 
students’ moves before he/she makes the move. As such, each student assigns a 
subjective probability θ, (0 < θ < 1), to any other student’s propensity to working.  
The third student’s decision to work or not plays the crucial role in the overall 
project grade. If the third student thinks, based on θ, that the other two students will 
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work, his/her preferred strategy would be not to work. On the other hand if the third 
student thinks, based on θ, that only one other student will work, his/her decision to work 
or not to work will depend upon how badly he/she wants to avoid an F. That is, whether 
the student is Less Motivated student or Industrious student. If the third student is 
Industrious student and he/she thinks that only one other student will work, he/she will 
decide to work and the project grade will be an A (top-left corner). On the other hand if 
the third student is Less Motivated student, he/she will decide not to work, regardless of 
the decision(s) of other student(s). 
Instructional Model 6 maintains the rest of the assumptions of Model 5 except 
that it has N > 3 students in a group, and at least k students have to work to get a good 
grade, where N is the number of students and k > N-k.  
The payoffs matrix is presented in Table 4. In this model, the decision of the ith 
student to work or not to work plays the crucial role. If the ith student thinks, based on θ, 
that k other students will work, or that k-2 other students will not work, his/her preferred 
strategy would be not to work, regardless of whether the ith student is Industrious student 
or Less Motivated student. The project grades will be A (lower-right corner) and F 
(lower-left corner), respectively. In the event that k-1 other students work (middle 
column), the preferred strategy by the ith student depends upon his/her preferences for an 
A as opposed to an F. That is, whether the student is Industrious student or Less 
Motivated student.  
 Therefore, group projects allow students who do not work to take advantage of 
students who work, most often at the expense of lower grades for students who work. In 
infinitely repeated games or games with an unknown number of repetitions, the outcome 
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may be different. In these cases backward induction does not apply. This affects the 
future strategies of players (students in our case) who do not work. The infinitely 
repeated games (or games with finite repetitions with unknown number of repetitions) 
scenario resembles the real workplace. However a classroom setting does not allow for 
infinitely repeated games. This makes the use of groups and group projects in a 
classroom setting not only ineffective, it often results in hurting the grades of students 
who work.  
 
Conclusion 
 The ability to be a team player is one of the top characteristics that employers 
desire in a prospective employee. College and university professors across the U.S. try to 
introduce students with the benefits of teamwork by assigning group projects. Using a 
game-theoretic approach, groups and group projects in a classroom setting fail to achieve 
the expected results. Due to the nature of the classroom setting, the problem of free riding 
not only intensifies, it may result in making Less Motivated students proficient free 
riders. The models indicate that the use of groups and group projects as pedagogical tools 
should be reconsidered. The models also indicate that penalizing Less Motivated students 
for free riding is not enough. Unless there is some reward for Industrious students for 
carrying Less Motivated students along, Industrious student will be short-changed in 
terms of grades. That is, Less Motivated students will get good grades at the expense of 
lower grades for Industrious students. 
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Table 1  
Instructional Model 1 Payoffs Matrix 
 
   Industrious Student 
  Doesn’t Work Works 
Less Motivated Student Doesn’t Work F, F B, B 
 Works B, B A, A 
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Table 2  
Instructional Model 2 Payoffs Matrix 
 
  Industrious Student  
  Doesn’t Work Works 
Less Motivated Student Doesn’t Work F, F C, B 
 Works B, C A, A 
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Table 3  
Instructional Model 5 Payoffs Matrix 
 
  1 Other  
Works 
2 Others 
Work 
Third Student 
Works Project Grade: A Project Grade: A 
 Doesn’t Work Project Grade: F Project Grade: A 
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Table 4  
Instructional Model 6 Payoffs Matrix 
 
  k-2 Others 
Work 
k-1 Others  
Work 
k Others 
Work 
 
Student i 
Works Project Grade: F Project Grade: A Project Grade: A 
 Doesn’t Work Project Grade: F Project Grade: F Project Grade: A 
 
 
 
 
